The institutional Framework Agreement (InstA) Switzerland – EU in the version of November 22, 2018 has serious weaknesses. AOnly careful reading reveals its obvious shortcomings. By das agreement in this version the relationships betweenn Switzerland and the EU nNot placed on a secure base, as would have been expected, but weakened. Instead of more legal certainty, there will be more legal uncertainty. Switzerland surrenders itself to the EU without need, it becomes the place it faces and has to be careful never to scare the EU away.
Why? Article 22.2 of the InstA states that both contracting parties, the EU and Switzerland, ias agreement can cancel at any time, even for no reason. This is standard international contract practice and it may sound harmless, but it is not. The problem is that Article 17 puts the new framework agreement at the top of everyone bilateral agreement – the last, newest agreement Switzerland – The EU becomes the first: if it falls away, everyone falls too youba Bilateraln Agreement I and subsequently Schengen–Dublin-Aget away as well as all subsequent new market access agreements. What then remains of the bilateral path would be the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of 1972 and its follow-up agreement as well as parts of the Bilaterals II of 2004.
Having to accept this potential threat is unworthy of a sovereign country.
This seemingly harmless regulation in Art. 22.2 has the potentialwithial, the bilateral route Switzerland – To largely destroy the EU. Thanks to this termination option, the EU can blackmail Switzerland at any time, in line with Goethe’s Erlkönig: “And you are du not willing, so i need force. ” This threatening manwithTo have to accept iality is unworthy of a sovereign country.
But that’s not all: The EU and Switzerland have recorded in an additional protocol to the InstA that they want to renegotiate the 1972 free trade agreement six months after the framework agreement was signed. This formulates the intention to also place the FTA under the institutional logic of the new framework agreement. If the revision negotiations failed, it would be conceivable that Switzerland would be left without an FTA, which would definitely end the bilateral path. This would be a situation comparable to a Brexit without an agreement, So a Relapse to WTO law. In this case, Switzerland would probably only have the option of late joining the EEA or joining the EU.
Just don’t sign now
It is only to be hoped that the Federal Council will not sign the InstA (with a few minor “clarifications”) in the euphoria about the victory on September 27, 2020 over the SVP’s limitation initiative. History would repeat itself: After the Swiss voted yesvolks on the IMF / World Bank accession in 1992, the Federal Council also drew the wrong conclusion: Er launched the unfortunate application to join the EU.
It is in Switzerland’s interest to have good relations with the EU. Secure access to the large EU internal market is important for our country. This requires good, also new bilateral agreements and an InstA that does not stand above the previous agreements, but is limited to the issues of legal development and dispute resolution in all existing and possibleentuell to regulate new bilateral agreements without the EuGH a special role in arbitration.
The present framework agreement must be streamlined and made more balanced. It should also be made clear that Switzerland does not have to adopt the Union Citizens’ Directive because, as a third country to the EU, it ties the right of residence in our country to work and not just to its Be here. The control of state aid should also not be tightened; Art. 17 of the Free Trade Agreement is already sufficient for this.
If the EU and the Federal Council do not see this major need for revision of the present framework agreement, this should be at the ballot box with the Swiss at the latestvolk, who has a good feel for sham packaging, fail.
Posted today at 9:29 am